EXHIBIT "H" (Part 1)

	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
	EVART ENTERPRISES,	INC.,	X : 07-CV-5441 (DLC)
		Plaintiff,	:
	v.		: 500 Pearl Street
	GENTLEMAN'S VIDEO,	INC., et al.,	: New York, New York :
		Defendants.	: :
			X
	TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR STATUS CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS F. EATON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE		
	APPEARANCES:		
For the Plaintiff: H. NICHOL		CHOLAS GOODMAN, ESQ.	
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			ork, New York 10022
	For the Defendant:	ᡓᡣᡢᢧ᠘ᡓᡕ	D RUDOFSKY, ESQ.
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THE COURT: 07-CV-5441.

All right. We're here with Nicholas Goodman for plaintiff Evart Enterprises and Edward Rudofsky for defendants Gentleman's Video, et al.,

Mr. Goodman, what's the status of this case?

MR. GOODMAN: Okay, Judge, just to go back to your

initial comments about the two cases pending, there was a

previous case and I don't have the index number in front of me.

I could find it.

THE COURT: I have it. 06-CV-13207.

MR. GOODMAN: Okay. Thank you, Judge.

That case was settled by a settlement agreement dated January 29, 2007 and there was subsequently a consent order and permanent injunction signed by Judge Cote in February. In March I sent a letter to Mr. Rudofsky indicating a default under the settlement agreement and my threat to proceed with contempt proceedings. I have not since followed through on that threat and we are not here pursuing contempt remedies under that settlement. So that basically all that's here before you today is the second case, that's 07-CV-5441. That is a case in which Mr. Rudofsky and I were unable to come to any kind of agreement in the period of April or May. The first complaint is filed and served in June. There was an extension of time granted by Your Honor until the end of July to answer or move. Mr. Rudofsky made a motion. I then filed an amended

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complaint and that amended complaint is before you today and the defendants have not yet answered that amended complaint. In fact, their time to answer doesn't run until tomorrow and obviously we would be amenable to a reasonable adjournment or extension of the time to answer. So what you have before you today is just that second case and the second case involves two different copyright infringements and we're alleging, also, trademark Lanham Act infringements.

Your question was as to the status of settlement. It's been clear from the beginning that Mr. Rudofsky and his clients have sought to convince me and apparently to convince the Court also that the second action in their words is not warranted or should not proceed, that they would like it not to I have attempted at various points including recently last week to try to translate that into a settlement negotiation over money. There has not been up until just prior to this conference an offer by the defendants in settlement and just to let you know more accurately where we're at today, last week on Tuesday I spoke to Mr. Rudofsky and I said, look, I know you want to bring your client to the conference in front of Magistrate Eaton, I know you want to have some kind of discussion but you've got to make some kind of offer, are you going to make an offer of settlement because otherwise I don't see that it's worth me bringing my client in or pursuing that whole course if there isn't going to be any offer at all and

4 that was on Tuesday. On Friday I got an e-mail from Mr. Rudofsky saying, I'm talking to my clients, I'll get you an e-2 mail shortly to tell you where we're at in effect. I never got 3 that second e-mail and Mr. Rudofsky told me this morning that he did in fact send that e-mail. I never saw it. So he has 5 now conveyed to me what is apparently in that second e-mail 6 that I didn't get which was a very minimal settlement offer. 7 It really amounts to a few thousand dollars literally. 8 Obviously, I haven't had a chance to convey that to my client 9 but I can tell you that it's certainly not sufficient to settle 10 this case or really not sufficient to even stimulate further 11 serious discussions. 12 So that's where we're at. We have as of, you know, a 13 few minutes ago the conveyance of a very minimal settlement 14 offer. We are certainly willing on our end as a plaintiff to 15 engage in discussions. I've told Mr. Rudofsky repeatedly that 16 we would be interested in settling this case. We're not trying 17 to push thing and put anybody out of business or "hurt anybody" 18 but there has to be a recognition of the serious copyright 19 infringements that have taken place. The clear likelihood -- a 20 high probability that there's going to be a finding of 21 willfulness, the mere certainty that there's going to be a 22 finding for the plaintiffs for the attorneys fees expended, 23

those attorneys fees are already in excess of the amount of the

offer that was conveyed to me. I don't know the exact number

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but that can be ascertained pretty quickly.

So, you know, at the point that the defendants want to step up and recognize that there are two very serious infringements here, the high likelihood of a finding of willfulness and attorneys fees, statutory damages, you know, I'm sure we can talk but that point hasn't arrived yet and so in the absence of going forward and having a serious settlement discussion we're ready to enter a scheduling order and get discovery lined up and get a trial date set for the future and move forward.

THE COURT: Well, all right. I see that neither side has brought a decision-maker from the client.

MR. RUDOFSKY: May I address that?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. RUDOFSKY: Good morning.

First of all, I did want to start on that point. I somewhat want to apologize to the Court. The plan was for Mr. Esposito to be here. Unfortunately, Mrs. Esposito was severely injured and hospitalized and I spoke to him as late as about 7:30 or so New York time last night and he said he was just unable to leave California and leave her. I have his phone number. He is available, notwithstanding the time difference, if there was anything to discuss. So I apologize to the Court for that because certainly one of the reasons we had scheduled a conference for today was to enable him to make arrangements

to come and unfortunately he couldn't do that.

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Secondly, I do want to reaffirm what counsel said. I absolutely sent -- and I don't know why he didn't receive it or didn't see it -- him an e-mail last Friday night after discussion with the client outlining the settlement proposal that we were prepared to go forward with or at least to discuss so it's unfortunate that he didn't see it but he says he didn't.

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Let me back up now if I may. The first case was commenced, I believe, in November 2006 and we settled it preanswer in good faith, entered into a settlement agreement, entered into a consent injunction which we have carried forward with. We received a letter from Mr. Goodman on March 29th in which he complained about several alleged breaches or possible breaches of that agreement including -- and, this, I think is important -- the facts upon which the present complaint is based -- the new complaint. We immediately or very quickly if not immediate in the sense of the same day or two days later but very, very soon thereafter, we compiled a list of everything that the defendants had done to comply with the prior settlement agreement. There were one or two ministerial items that had to be attended to; filings of an affidavit of compliance or some such thing with the court. We took care of that. We wrote to Mr. Goodman, we outlined everything that had been done --

THE COURT: I've read that letter of April 26th.

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MR. RUDOFSKY: I'm sure Your Honor has.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. RUDOFSKY: Notwithstanding that, the plaintiffs decided to go ahead with a second suit and asked if we would accept service of a complaint which we eventually did, of course, but when we realized the plaintiffs wanted to bring -the intention was to bring a second action rather than to treat the situation as enforcement of the original stipulation and consent decree we immediately wrote to Judge Cote and requested a conference. We have the complication of the second action because plaintiff has chosen to file a second action which, whether it's a meritorious action or not, I guess one would say was there right. So we end up talking about two actions but from our point of view we entered into a settlement which includes a provision for notice of defaults and an opportunity to cure defaults expressly. We were notified of the default, we cured it or say we cured it. The client is prepared to explain, whether it's a hearing or a trial or a settlement conference, or whatever forum or venue, is prepared to explain everything that he has done and if requested -- you know, if he's asked he'll say whether he's willing to do and he tells me he is willing to do anything within reason to police the original settlement which was a substantial settlement of \$75,000.00 and was intended to buy peace between these two

sides and the words that we used in our letter was that we did not think the second suit was necessary or appropriate and that is really our position and we think there was a settlement, we don't think that the second suit should go forward. If it's going to go forward, of course, we're going to defend it.

Complicating the settlement is the fact that the client tells me and I represent to Your Honor that at least this is his position and if he was here he would tell you himself that he doesn't have the money to deal with the kind of settlement demand that is being made which is a larger demand in amount than the first settlement. So it's not only substantial, it's even more substantial and so putting aside any analysis of the merits or the risk of litigation, he doesn't have the money.

We also would like to settle this. We thought we had settled it. If there are problems as there inevitably are or often are in such cases with policing the settlement we don't think those problems are to be solved with a second lawsuit, they're to be solved with either telling us what else the plaintiff would like us to do to police the first settlement and implement the first settlement or if we are contemptuously violating the consent order which we do not believe is remotely the case, to move to hold us in contempt but they haven't done that. They threatened to do it, they didn't do it. I think we made a clear showing not only that we weren't in contempt but

9 that we hadn't really violated the order and there may well be 1 product out there that our client has sought to recall, has 2 offered to substitute replacement product, third parties/fourth 3 parties who have the product who are not complying with the 4 recall or are continuing to offer this line that the plaintiff 5 objects to. The end result, I think, is going to be testimony 6 that our client has done as much as he possibly can and 7 certainly as much as he could reasonably be required to do. 8 tells me this has cost him in lost sales and enforcement 9 efforts well in excess of \$100,000.00, that he can't do anymore 10 and that Mr. Goodman was explaining to me earlier that even as 11 late as whatever date he was referring to, May or July or 12 something, someone put up this line on the internet and it's hard to believe -- it's impossible for him to believe that my 14 client wasn't the source of it. That's not true and my client 15 is able to establish that he has sent a recall notice and taken 16 down the line and done everything that he believes is 17 reasonable to satisfy the plaintiff and if there is something 18 else that he should be doing, you know, there shouldn't be the 19 litigation form of twenty questions. 20 THE COURT: Well, you know, I think this is --21 MR. RUDOFSKY: So that's our position. We would love 22 to settle this but (a) we're not sure what they want us to do 23 on the non-financial side other than what we've done and on the

financial side at this moment we don't have the wherewithal to

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satisfy their financial demands and on that basis alone the parties are too far apart to settle it certainly today.

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THE COURT: Well, I think that's right and, you know, I think Judge Cote was hoping that somehow there could be a settlement. It sounds to me as if the non-monetary part probably could be worked out but the monetary part, the parties are just way apart and, therefore, I think Judge Cote is going to be the one who is going to decide whether this second case can proceed and I think all I can do is set up a scheduling order. Mr. Goodman is willing to give you a little time beyond tomorrow, September 12th, and I don't know whether you're going to put in an answer or a motion to Judge Cote. Do you have any idea what the first step would be?

MR. RUDOFSKY: Well, we will make a motion with respect to the amended complaint. We had moved with respect to the first complaint. Counsel cured what we perceived to be a defect in that pleading.

THE COURT: Right. So now we have an amended -MR. RUDOFSKY: So now we have an amended complaint
and we'll move on the grounds of the prior settlement,
certainly, and see what comes of that.

THE COURT: Well, if we're sure that it's going to be a motion, I don't know that there's any need for discovery before that motion is heard by Judge Cote. What's plaintiff's view on that?

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MR. GOODMAN: Well, I am having a hard time understanding what the grounds of the motion would be; that a motion to dismiss a complaint that alleges two copyrighting infringements on the grounds that that case cannot proceed because a prior settlement was entered and the remedy should be pursued under that settlement? I'm not sure that --

THE COURT: I think that's essentially it and Judge Cote may agree or disagree but that's her call. She may for all I know feel that the whole point of that consent order that she signed was to handle situations like this. On the other hand, she may agree with plaintiff that it's plaintiff's right to pursue this as a new lawsuit without calling it a violation of the old consent agreement and my only question is is there any sort of limited preliminary discovery that's needed before Judge Cote decides that motion? If not, I would think that we would schedule nothing today except a briefing schedule for Judge Cote and then after she makes her decision then we could have another conference here or even by telephone or, perhaps, the attorneys could just get together a scheduling order if in fact Judge Cote says, yes, this is going to be a full-fledged second lawsuit and then there will be deadlines for fact discovery, expert discovery and a deadline for motions for summary judgment and somewhere in this whole process maybe the parties will reach some agreement. The big sticking point seems to be the amount of money and if that could be solved I

12 have a feeling that the non-monetary portions could be settled 1 2 MR. GOODMAN: Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 MR. GOODMAN: If I could? I'm sorry, I didn't mean 5 to interrupt. 6 It seems to me that even if -- and I think that it's 7 very doubtful it would go that way -- but even if Judge Cote 8 determines somehow that the second action could not proceed as 9 a second action but remedies were to be pursued under the 10 settlement agreement, I don't see really how that could happen. 11 But assuming that happened there clearly are two copyright 12 infringements that happened --13 THE COURT: Right. 14 MR. GOODMAN: I don't think there's any doubt about 15 I don't think Mr. Rudofsky or his clients even dispute 16 They may say that they were innocent, they may say we 17 took as many steps as we could to stop that from happening and 18 so forth but there has to be even under the terms of the 19 settlement agreement if you want to look at it through that 20 prism some remedy for what they did. Let's not forget that one 21 of these two infringements occurred for the first time after 22 the settlement agreement was signed. They released a new film 23 four days after they signed off on the settlement agreement. THE COURT: The two ones I know about had been 25

abbreviated as Hart and Fox.

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MR. GOODMAN: Fox came out after the settlement agreement was entered into. It didn't even exist prior. It has a purported 2007 copyright notice on it from the defendants and that's why we're talking about willfulness, that's why we're talking about a number of other issues.

Clearly, there would need to be discovery under any rubric for what happened as Mr. Rudofsky eluded to. Some time in the neighborhood of just a few weeks ago my clients got a telephone call, do you realize the entire Golden Age of Porn line including the titles from the first action are available now on the internet on a site called Smashbox.com. The whole line is there. It came up for the first time -- they found it for the first time in August. Apparently, it had been put on the internet in May 2007. They've probably purchased this product, you know, somewhere between ten and fifteen times and that's only the times they actually documented purchases. there's a world of information that we would need concerning remedies no matter whether you're looking at those at remedies under the settlement agreement or remedies or the new action. We would like to proceed with that and I don't think it's useful to go back to Judge Cote with a motion and to enter a briefing schedule now in the absence of that kind of discovery because we're just going to get there one way or the other anyway and I think it's worth me saying here to you and to Mr.

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Rudofsky, I made a judgment that contempt -- the showing necessary for a finding of contempt might not be made; it might be made or it might not be made and the issue there was whether the copyrights for the two new infringements were in the name of Evart and in fact they were in a different name because Evart acquired them through a chain of title and they weren't originally registered under the name Evart. So I made a determination that a showing of contempt would be an open question that we didn't want to pursue but, nonetheless, there are infringements there. The fact that they don't amount to contempt under the standards that are applied to contempt proceedings doesn't mean they weren't copyright infringements, doesn't mean they weren't willful, doesn't mean that there isn't remedy due and we pursue the second action. All of this was discussed more or less and there were a bunch of e-mails and telephone conferences and so forth that we had over a period of months.

So that's where we're at. So I think it would -THE COURT: Well, what if it turns out despite your
wishes that Judge Cote says, I've accepted the second case as a
related case but I don't want it to go forward as an
independent action, I want it to be pursued solely as a
contempt type of proceeding? If that is her decision then your
settlement evaluation may go down because you may feel that
although you don't like it there are some legal impediments to

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winning on the contempt theory because the copyright of Hart and Fox was originally obtained by a non-party and then somehow acquired by this defendant and, you know, you'll just have to make an evaluation if that changes your settlement posture and I just don't see that there's any urgency to taking this discovery. It seems to me logical that the first question is the one that will have to be decided by Judge Cote as to whether this is being handled solely as a contempt or as plaintiff would prefer it, a complete second action. I don't think any discovery is needed by either side at the moment. I don't think there's a danger that evidence is going to be lost or memories fade and both sides seem to think that it's significant to know whether or not Judge Cote is going to allow this as a full-fledged second action so let's find out and then it may well be that the discovery is more or less the same discovery no matter what her decision is but at least the parties will know what her feeling is, what her ruling is and before they embark on that discovery maybe they will have a chance to settle the case if they feel that her decision has somehow made the case less valuable or more valuable for the plaintiff. So my inclination is just to set a briefing schedule for Judge Cote. I have a feeling that she distinctly saw that possibility coming and was hoping that the parties could just

reach a settlement and avoid that briefing but, you know, it